Between Saying and Doing by Brandom Robert B.;

Between Saying and Doing by Brandom Robert B.;

Author:Brandom, Robert B.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA - OSO
Published: 2008-12-14


… some kind of openness, variableness, or satisfiability characterizes all hypothetical statements alike, whether they are recognized “variable hypotheticals” like “For all x, if x is a man, x is mortal” or are highly determinate hypotheticals like “If today is Monday, tomorrow is Tuesday.”8

By contrast to such two-stage approaches, semantics done in terms of incompatibility is directly modal. One may, if one likes, think of the incompatibility of p and q as the impossibility of both being true. But that characterization in terms of truth is entirely optional. Incompatibility is itself already a modal notion, and for semantic purposes we can treat it as primitive. The explication I have offered is in pragmatic terms: saying (in terms of the normative notions of commitment and entitlement) what one must do in order to be taking or treating two claims as incompatible. The element of generality comes in because in assessing entailments we look at all the claims that are incompatible with the conclusions and the premises. One claim is an incompatibility consequence of another only if there is no set of sentences incompatible with the conclusion and not with the premises. And here it is important that the potential defeasors are not limited to sentences that are true. Even if as a matter of fact all the coins in my pocket are copper, that a coin is in my pocket does not entail that it is copper, since “This coin is silver” is incompatible with its being copper, but not with its being in my pocket, even though it is not true that it is in my pocket. For, as we want to say, it could be in my pocket: that non-actual state of affairs is possible. That modal fact is reflected in the fact that a coin’s being silver is not incompatible with its being in my pocket. The idea that I want to explore is that once we have properly learned the lesson that modality matters in semantics because counterfactually robust inferences are an essential aspect of the articulation of the conceptual contents of sentences, the way is opened up to a directly modal semantics, which does not make what now appears as an unnecessary preliminary detour through assessments of truth.

This is all very abstract. In order to see incompatibility semantics in action, we should look to the case where the criteria of adequacy of a semantics are clearest: namely, to semantics for logical vocabulary. That, after all, is where possible-worlds semantics cut its teeth.



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